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After the relationship between geometry and algebra 
exemplified in his distinction between geometrical and 
mechanical lines is examined, the basis for Descartes' 
limited approach to analytical geometry is discussed in 
connection with his reflections on method. It is argued 
that his epistemology, which required that conceptual 
thinking be accompanied by a construction supplied by 
the imagination, in conjunction with the significant role 
he attributed to mnemonic devices, helps to clarify the 
methodological background for Descartes' distinctive ap- 
proach to geometry. 
Nach einer Untersuchung iiber die Beziehung von Geo- 
metrie und Algebra, wie es aus der Cartesischen Teilung 
von "geometrischen" und "mechanischen" Linien entnommen 
werden kann, wi'rd die methodologischen Grundlagen Des- 
cartes' Einstellung zur Geometrie diskutiert. Es wird 
behauptet, dass die Anforderung, die Descartes aus er- 
kenntnistheoretischen Griinden gestellt hat, das Urteils 
prozess mit einen durch die Einbildungskraft hergestell- 
tes Anschauungsbild immer begleiten zu miissen, in Ver- 
bindung mit der Bedeutung, die zur mnemotechnischen 
Ger;ite im Cartesischen System zugeschrieben wird, den 
methodologischen Hintergrund der Geom&trie erhellt. 
Aprbs avoir QtudiQ les relations entre la ggomgtrie 
et l'algZ?bre telles qu'illustrges par la distinction 
faite par Descartes entre les courbes ggomgtriques et 
mgcaniques, nous gtudions les bases de son approche res- 
treinte de la ggomCtrie analytique, en les mettant en 
rapport avec ses rgflexions sur la mgthode. Nous soute- 
nons que la mise en conjonction de son gpistgmologie, 
qui exige que la pens&e conceptuelle soit accompagnge 
de constructions issues de l'imagination, et du role pre- 
ponderant qu'il attribue aux moyens mngmotechniques, 
nous aide 2 &clairer l'arriere-plan methodologique de 
l'approche de la g6omGtrie particuliare 2 Descartes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: DESCARTES' RESTRICTIVE THEORY OF ANALYSIS 
Because it makes use of algebraic equations and a coordinate 
framework in treating geometrical problems, Descartes' Geometry 
is often cited as the first rudimentary text in analytical ge- 
ometry. However, Carl Boyer has pointed out that this view of 
Descartes' work must be qualified, for while the Geometry employed 
many tools characteristic of an analytic geometry, the insight 
which grounded Descartes' mathematical thought was incompatible 
with the fundamental notion of analytic geometry [Boyer 1956, 
102 ff.]. The notion central to an analytic treatment of geometry 
is that equations define curves in space. The analytic geometer 
begins with an equation in two or three variables and, by a suit- 
able choice of a coordinate frame, produces a geometric interpre- 
tation of that equation in two- or three-space. By employing a 
transformation of axes, it may be possible to reduce the equa- 
tion originally given to a canonical form which represents some 
well-known figure from plane or solid geometry. For the per- 
spective of analytic geometry, the equation is the essential 
datum, and it has an ontological priority over the gometrical 
construction. For Descartes, on the other hand, the only object 
of concern was the geometric construction, and equations were 
employed simply as a shorthand way of performing time-consuming 
geometrical operations. Equations by themselves had no onto- 
logical significance. They were only a useful symbolic language 
in which one could store geometrical constructions. 
Descartes' conception of coordinate geometry is indicated 
by an example he gave which was supposed to demonstrate the 
power and utility of his method. In Book II of the Geometry, 
he solved the four-line locus problem of Pappus, one of the 
problems which had supposedly eluded the persistent efforts 
of the Greek analysts 111. The general statement of the so- 
called Problem of Pappus is this: 
Having three, four, or more lines given in position, 
it is required to find a point from which the same 
number of lines can be drawn, each making a given 
angle with one of the given lines, so that the rect- 
angle of two of the lines drawn bears a constant 
given ratio to the square of the third line (if 
there be only three), or to the rectangle of the 
other two (if there be four) . . . [Descartes 1637, 3071. 
Descartes solved the most general case of the four-line locus, 
where no two of the lines given in position, namely, AB, AD, EF, 
and GH, are parallel (Fig. 1). First, he assumed that a point 
C had been found satisfying the conditions of the problem, and 
such that lines CB, CD, CF, CH could be drawn for the given 
angles CBA, CDA, CFE, CHG to the given lines AB, AD, EF, GH. 
In order to establish a basis for reducing the various relations 
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FIGURE 1 
in the problem to a unified expression, he referred all the lines 
to two principal line segments, namely, AB and CB, which he 
designated as X and Y, respectively. This was accomplished by 
examining the triangles resulting from the intersection of all 
the other lines with AB and CD. Since the lines AB and AD and 
angle CBA are given, all the angles of triangle ABR are known, 
so that the ratio of the sides AB:BR is also known (as z/b for 
example). Descartes thus obtained the expression bx/z for BR, 
leading to y+bx/z for CR. Similar considerations led to linear 
expressions in two variables for all the other line segments in 
the problem. Multiplying these expressions in the manner pre- 
scribed by the statement of the problem, Descartes arrived, 
after reduction and simplification, to a second-degree equation 
of the form Ax'+Bxy +Cy* +Dx +Ey =0 as the equation for the 
locus. He went on to demonstrate that, depending upon the 
constants and the signs appearing in the equation, there was 
one conic section such that any point chosen on it would satisfy 
the conditions 'of the problem. 
Not to call this an analytic treatment of the locus problem 
might appear at first glance to be making a distinction without 
a difference; for nothing really separates the way a modern 
geometer would attack this problem from Descartes' own solution, 
except perhaps the use of an oblique coordinate frame. Boyer ' s 
point, however, is that a world of difference separates Descartes' 
view of this problem from the way we see it today. It may appear 
that Descartes had reduced the Problem of Pappus to its algebraic 
statement, solved it algebraically, and then given a geometric 
interpretation of the algebraic solution. However, that is not 
the way Descartes envisioned the analysis, for in his mind there 
was no significant departure from the real, concrete plane of 
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geometrical constructions. To see this crucial point, one has 
to consider Descartes' solution in the context of the founda- 
tions that had been laid earlier in Book I. 
What he had demonstrated is that the roots of algebraical 
equations involving a single variable can be constructed geo- 
metrically through procedures involving the straightedge and 
compass, the rigorous basis for which had been treated formally 
in Books II, V, and VI of Euclid's Elements. This approach was 
not, of course, original with Descartes. A similar presentation 
had been given somewhat earlier by Vi&te, among others [Mahoney 
1973, 37 ff.]. But Descartes wanted to extend this constructi- 
vist approach by devising techniques for finding geometrically 
the roots of equations involving two unknowns. The justifica- 
tion for his solution of the four-line locus problem lay in the 
fact that each algebraic manipulation he made in arriving at 
the result corresponded to a definite geometrical operation. 
He wished to do more than to establish the conditions under which 
algebraic equations can be given a possible geometrical inter- 
pretation. Rather, he wanted to demonstrate that once geometrical 
techniques had been introduced for constructing algebraic equa- 
tions in two variables, the resulting economy of expression could 
aid the investigation of curves more complex than those admitted 
by the ancients. At issue, then, was an attempt to extend the 
class of objects to be included in geometry; it was not an attempt 
to identify the domains of algebra and geometry. Unless they 
could be accompanied by a geometrical construction, algebraic 
equations were regarded by Descartes as the result of a meaning- 
less play with empty symbols. 
Implicit in Books I and II of the Geometry was more than 
a justification for using algebra and coordinate frameworks for 
solving geometrical problems: Descartes was also expressing a 
viewpoint about the nature of his analytic method and the limits 
of its legitimate use. For Descartes, the only algebraic equa- 
tions admissible in geometry were equations for which a geometric 
construction could be provided. Moreover, not every geometric 
construction was permitted; he preferred to admit only those 
which could be described by a single continuous motion. Clearly 
such a view is not compatible with the principle fundamental to 
analytic geometry: that every equation defines a curve. Descartes 
conception of the legitimate uses of algebra in geometry forced 
him to limit the curves that are the proper objects of geometrical 
study. "The only curves admitted for study in geometry," he 
said, "are those that can be conceived of as described by a 
single continuous motion or by several successive motions, each 
motion being completely determined by those which precede, for 
in this way an exact knowledge of the magnitude of each is always 
obtainable" [Descartes 1637, 3161. Thus the conic sections were 
proper objects of geometrical study, because a mechanical con- 
struction involving a single continuous motion (such as the 
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"gardener's" construction of the ellipse) could be provided for 
each of them. 
From reading Pappus, Descartes learned that the ancients 
had distinguished between three classes in problems involving 
constructions. Constructions involving straightedge and compass 
were considered "plane," while those involving conic sections, 
such as the construction of two mean proportionals, were called 
"solid." The constructions included in these two classes were 
considered the object of truly "geometrical" study, whereas the 
third class, including curves which could only be constructed 
by some imagined mechanical contrivance, where to be excluded 
from geometry [il. From Descartes' perspective this classifica- 
tion had excluded too much, for the same mechanical linkage that 
sufficed to construct a locus, such as a circle or conic section, 
could also be used to construct more complex curves: 
Consider the lines AB, AD, AF, and so forth (Fig. 2), 
which we may suppose to be described by means of the 
instrument YZ. This instrument consists of several 
rulers hinged together in such a way that, YZ being 
placed along the line AN, the angle XYZ can be de- 
creased or increased in size, and when its sides are 
together, the points B, C, D, E, F, G, H, all coincide 
with A; but as the size of the angle is increased, the 
ruler BC, fastened at right angles to XY at the point 
B, pushes toward Z the ruler CD, which slides along 
YZ always at right angles. In like manner, CD pushes 
DE, which slides along YX always parallel to BC; DE 
pushes EF; EF pushes FG; FG pushes GH; and so on. Thus 
we may imagine an infinity of rulers, each pushing an- 
other, half of them making equal angles with 
the rest with YZ [Descartes 1637, 317-3181. 
YX and 
FIGURE 2 
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As the angle XYZ increases, point B describes a circle, point 
D traces out the curve x4= a2 (x2+y2), point F describes the 
curve x8 =a2 (x2 +y2) 3, and so on. Other mechanical devices 
could be imagined which generate a hierarchy of more complex 
curves, all related to the description of one of the other conic 
sections. As an example, Descartes described a similar mechanical 
linkage for generating a hyperbola. By using that curve as the 
basis for determining the next sequence of movements in the 
linkage, a more complex curve would be generated with a correspond- 
ingly more complex equation. Having demonstrated that the very 
same process for constructing the roots upon which the tonics 
depend can be extended to the constructions of ever more complex 
curves, Descartes observed, 
I see no reason why the description of the curve AD 
cannot be conceived as clearly and distinctly as that 
of the circle, or at least that of the conic sections, 
or why that of the second, third, or any other (curve) 
that can be thus described, cannot be as clearly con- 
ceived of as the first, and therefore I see no reason 
why they should not be used in the same way in the 
solution of geometric problems [Descartes 1637, 318- 
3191. 
The limitation of curves considered as truly geometrical to 
the class of curves determined by a single continuous motion had 
important consequences for Descartes' conception of analytic 
geometry; it forced him to exclude transcendental curves. It 
was these curves that Descartes wished to classify as "mechanical. 
The reason behind this move emerges from his consideration of 
a problem, proposed to him by Florimond De Beaune (via Mersenne), 
involving the construction of a logarithmic curve. The state- 
ment of De Beaune's problem was as follows: 
Being given any straight line b whatsoever, draw 
two infinite straight lines BK and LQ which cut 
one another at a point A forming an angle of 45'. 
It is required to construct the curve AX0 such 
that, if from any point X taken at random on that 
curve, the tangent XG be drawn, as well as the 
ordinate XY with respect to the axis, the ratio 
between XY and GY will be constantly equal to the 
ratio of the given line b to the segment of the 
ordinate XI [3]. 
That is to say, it was required to find a construction for the 
locus of points such that XY/GY = b/XI. 
From a brief inspection, it is evident that a solution to 
De Beaune's problem leads to a transcendental curve which can- 
not be produced by the strictly algebraic techniques outlined 
in the Geometry: designating AY=x, XY=y, and recalling that, 
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FIGURE 3 
from the statement of the problem, the axis LQ is inclined at 
450, we have AY=IY=x,IX=y- x; since for the subtangent we 
have the expression GY=ydx/dy, DeBeaune's problem requires the 
solution of the differential equation 
dY b -=-. 
dX Y-x 
The required curve is a logarithmic curve having the equation 
x=y+b+bCe-y ib, 
where C is an arbitrary constant. 
Descartes observed that the curve has an asymptote (as y 
gets larger, y=x+b is an asymptote) and that the subtangent 
is constant. He made use of these facts in devising his own 
attack. First he referred the problem to a different coordinate 
frame, using the asymptote BM as the new y-axis and treating B 
as the origin of coordinates. This transformation is given by 
x = b - (y -xl), 
Y =\ri- y'. 
In the new frame of reference, the subtangents are all equal to 
fib. 
After these preliminaries Descartes began his treatment 
of the problem, which was divided in two parts. In the first 
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he generated a method for a pointwise approximation of the curve 
by considering each point as the intersection of two infinitely 
close tangents. Dividing BA=b into m equal and arbitrarily 
small parts, Descartes assumed PV and RX (both drawn parallel 
to AB) to contain n and n -1 of those parts, respectively. At 
V and X tangents ZVN and GXM were constructed with the ultimate 
aim of determining the increment AY corresponding to the small 
increment AX in passing from PV to PX. As AX -+ 0 the point of 
intersection D approaches the curve AXO. 
From the similarity of the resulting triangles, two rela- 
tions yielding FD are derived: 
NP - E 
(a) py = 7 =FT, 
Assuming that PF= E and FR = w, we have, in (a), NP (the sub- 
tangent) = bfl , PV=nb/m,NF=bfl- E, andFD= (rib/m) - 
(ns/m fi); and in (b), MR (the subtangent)= b&, RX = (n - 1) 
b/m, MF = bfi+ w and FD = [(n-l)b/m] + [(n-l) w/m&T] . 
By equating the two expressions for FD, Descartes obtained upper 
and lowerbqundsfor PR = AY=E+w: b\JT/n < E+W C b&T/ (n-l). 
Setting s+U = \/2cl8, the inequality becomes b/n < cl6 < b/(n-1). 
Finally, treating A$ as the sum of these small segments cr$ 
generated by successive positions of PV and RX, Descartes arrived 
at a double inequality for A@: 
1 b; +m.dv + . . . +- 
m -1 n <Af3<b 
1 1 1 - +-+ . . . +-. 
m -1 m-2 n-l 
"In this manner, dividing AB into more and more parts, one is 
able to approach closer and closer the exact lengths of Act, and A6 
and by this means mechanically construct the proposed line" 
[Oeuvres, II, 5161. 
In the second part of his treatment of the problem, Descartes 
devised a mechanical method for constructing the curve exactly. 
He imagined it to be described by the intersection of two lines 
initially positioned along AH and AB and moving BR and RH, 
respectively. The problem was to determine the speeds of the 
two movements. If the line initially applied to AH moved toward 
BR at a constant rate traversing successive distances l/8, 2/8, 
3/8, 4/8, etc., the result of the previous determination of the 
infinitesimal segments a8 led to the conclusion that in the same 
time the line applied initially to AB traverses distances 8/7, 
8/6, 8/5, 8/4, etc. [4]. From this Descartes concluded: 
I suspect that these two movements are incommen- 
surable to such an extent that it will never be 
possible for one to regulate the other exactly, 
and thus this curve is one of those which I ex- 
cluded from my Geometry as being mechanical; 
hence, I am not surprised that I have not been 
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able to solve the problem in any way other than I 
have given here, for it is not a geometrical line 
[Oeuvres, II, 5171. 
This statement echoed the view presented in the Geometry: Trans 
cendental curves, such as the quadratrix and the spiral, were 
to be excluded from analytic geometry because "one could only 
imagine them as described by two separate motions which bear 
no ratio to one another" [Descartes 1637, 3171. 
The role of algebra in Descartes' mathematical analysis 
was to simplify the solution of geometrical problems that 
required difficult constructions. One used a mechanical link- 
age to construct a "canonical" form for equations of each order. 
Using the elementary operations described in Book I, every 
(algebraic) equation of a given class could be reduced to its 
canonical form, and hence a construction could be provided for 
it. "[By] reducing to a single construction all the problems 
of one class," he said in concluding the Geometry, "I have at 
the same time given a method of transforming them to an infinity 
of others, . . . it is only necessary to follow the same method 
to construct all problems more and more complex ad infinitum" 
[Descartes 1637, 4133. From this perspective algebra did not 
function as a direct means of investigating the essential 
structural relation of things; rather, it served as a device 
for the easy storage and quick retrieval of information regard- 
ing geometrical constructions [5]. 
One is tempted to dismiss Descartes' failure to grasp the 
full implications of an analytic approach to geometry by noting 
that the Geometry was the first attempt to formulate such a 
mathematical program, and that, therefore, one ought to expect 
imperfections. And yet it is significant that although he was 
in possession of an analytic technique powerful enough to 
generate a series approximation for the inverse tangent problem 
proposed by De Beaune, Descartes still claimed that the curve 
thus constructed was not a proper subject of analytic geometry; 
this indicates a deep and consciously formulated reason for 
excluding such constructions, rather than an inability, on 
Descartes' part, to grasp fundamental notions. Rather than 
dismiss the problem, we must ask: how did this metaphysical 
bias come to take root in Descartes' mathematical thought? 
2. RENAISSANCE METHODS OF INVENTION, MNEMONICS, 
AND DESCARTES' MATHESIS UNIVERSALIS 
There is little direct evidence of the exact path taken by 
Descartes in the formation of his mathematical ideas. Isaac 
Bee&man's "Journal" provides partial insight into some of the 
influences on the development of his mathematical thought, how- 
ever. For example, one section of the "Journal" bears the head- 
ing, "Autores mathematici mihi a Snellio patre commendate" 
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[Oeuvres, X, 291. Rudolph Snell held the chair of mathematics at 
Leyden from 1601-1613, and Bee&man attended his lectures during 
1609. It is well known that Bee&man was closely connected with 
Descartes' early development during the years while he was in 
Breda. Accordingly it is not unlikely that Bee&man passed 
his mentor's recommendation of important mathematical works on 
to Descartes. If we grant this assumption, then two of the 
authors mentioned by Bee&man must be considered as particularly 
important for Descartes' mathematical thought, namely, Pappus 
and the French pedagogue Petrus Ramus. For the 17th-century 
mathematician, Pappus was the primary source of information con- 
cerning classical methods of analysis. While only mathematical 
works of Ramus are mentioned in Bee&man's "Journal", it was 
Ramus' contribution to Renaissance concepts of methodology that 
holds particular interest for the thesis presented here. Many 
of Descartes' methodological and epistemological insights, as 
well as the ontological foundations of the Geometry, can be 
traced to this cross-fertilization of ideas drawn from classical 
analysis and Ramism [63. 
One source of the view expressed by Descartes in the Geometry 
can be traced to the origins of the algebraic movement in 17th- 
century mathematics. Nearly every aspect of Renaissance intel- 
lectual life was shaped by an interest in reviving the wisdom 
of antiquity, and mathematical thought was no exception. A 
familiar target of criticism of the Renaissance philosophes was 
Aristotelian logic. They complained that Aristotle's syllogistic 
logic was useful only for systematizing propositions already 
known to be true; but nowhere did Aristotle provide a heuristic 
tool for discovering the middle terms by means of which knowledge 
could be expanded‘info new frontiers. Accordingly, considerable 
interest was generated for exploring methods of invention. As 
the number of ancient mathematical texts increased, due to the 
efforts of the Humanists, interest in method spread to mathe- 
matical research. Upon closer examination of the more advanced 
treatises of Greek mathematics, such as Archimedes' Quadrature 
of the Parabola and On the Sphere and Cylinder, and Apollonius' 
Conies, particularly Book III where the focal properties of the 
conic sections were presented, it became clear that the Greeks 
must have had some special method by means of which they had 
discovered so many marvelous theorems. It was simply unimagin- 
able that they could have found all those theorems in the syn- 
thetie mode. The opinion emerged that the analytical method 
of the ancient mathematicians was a unviersal method for making 
new discoveries in every field of knowledge, and accordingly an 
effort was made to reconstruct the analytical methods of the 
ancients. 
It was not a simple matter to reconstruct this supposed 
analytical method. Some traces of it could be seen in the 
Mathematical Collection of Pappus, particularly in Book VII; 
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but the view developed that, on the whole, the ancients had 
scrupulously avoided making anything other than veiled references 
to it. According to Descartes, 
. . . some traces of this true mathematics seem to me to 
be found in Pappus and Diophantus, who lived, if not 
in the earliest ages, at least many centuries before 
these present times. Indeed I could readily believe 
that this mathematics was suppressed by these writers 
with a pernicious craftiness, . . . And I believe they 
preferred to show us in its place, as the product of 
their art certain barren truths which they cleverly 
demonstrate deductively so that we should admire them 
rather than teach us the method itself,... [Descartes 
1629, 376-377). 
Consequently, mathematicians attempting to reconstruct the ancient 
method found it necessary to mix new forms with those that could 
be gleaned from the works of Pappus, Diophantus, Proclus, Heron 
of Alexandria, and Archimedes. 
The new analysis substituted symbolic algebra for the geo- 
metrical algebra of the ancients. One of the first mathematicians 
to press algebra into the service of reconstructing the geometrical 
methods of the ancients was FranFois Vi&e. "The art which I 
present is not new," he wrote, "but in truth so old, so spoiled 
and defiled by the barbarians, that I consider it necessary to 
introduce an entirely new form into it and to think out a new 
vocabulary. And yet underneath the algebra, or Almucabala, which 
they lauded and called the great art, all mathematicians recog- 
nized that incomparable gold lay hidden," [Vi&te 1591, XII. 
In the conclusion to his Analytic Art, Vi&e expressed the view 
that every problem in geometry could be solved with the aid of 
algebraic analysis. 
Vi&e's program of developing a universal method of dis- 
covery included as one of its goals the reconstruction of the 
lost treatises on analysis described by Pappus in Book VII of 
the Mathematical Collection [Mahoney 1973, 39-401. Vi&e him- 
self provided a reconstruction of Apollonius' On Contacts (1600), 
and he attracted followers and students who carried the program 
further. Marino Ghetaldi added Apollonius' treatise On Inclina- 
tions (1607). Willebrord Snell restored the Determinate Section, 
the Section of Ratios, and the Section of Area (1608). The 
most illustrious member of Vi&e's analytic program was Pierre 
de Fermat. In 1628 Fermat set out to reconstruct Apollonius' 
treatise Ad iocos planos et solidos, and it is well known that 
in 1636, when he had finally succeeded in restoring the entire 
treatise, he was in possession of a powerful method based on 
the algebraic analysis of geometrical problems within a coordi- 
nate framework. 
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Fermat's mathematical career was evidence of the fruits 
that could be harvested by careful consideration of the analytical 
methods of the ancients, and in many ways it was representative 
of the path followed by those working on the frontiers of mathe- 
matical research even at midcentury. The key to Fennat's success 
lay in combining the new algebraic techniques with the methods 
of analysis that Pappus attributed to the ancients. As Michael 
Mahoney has shown, Fermat hit upon the notion of coordinate geo- 
metry when, in the course of reconstructing Apollonius' Plane 
loci, he joined algebraic operations on line lengths with the 
Archimedean method of finding centers of gravity: what we now 
call the "origin" of coordinates appeared in Fermat's solution 
of locus problems as a fulcrum point of two levers placed at 
right angles to one another [Mahoney 1973, 101-113, esp. 110 n.]. 
Practitioners of the analytical art considered themselves 
to have transcended the methods of the ancients, and in no sense 
did they regard the new algebraic analysis as an extension of 
classical mathematics. Still, they did consider the outstanding 
problems of ancient geometry a testing ground for the new tech- 
niques, and they continued to look to classical sources for in- 
sights in the construction of new analytical methods. Fermat's 
discovery of his method of maxima and minima and its relation 
to the determination of tangents is another case illustrating 
the importance of classical mathematics for the development of 
analysis. The discovery of the method of maxima and minima 
developed out of researches which intertwined Vi&e's method 
of finding the roots of an equation by syncrisis with studies 
on Diophantus' method of adequation. The crucial insight into 
the relation between these methods of finding the roots of an 
equation and the problem of tangents came in the course of re- 
constructing VII, Proposition 61 of Pappus' Mathematical Collec- 
tion [Mahoney 1973, 1671. 
Although the Geometry would seem to indicate that he ob- 
tained the fundamental insights of his analytical method by 
fusing modern and classical techniques, Descartes claimed that 
the development of his thought did not follow the same pattern 
as that followed by other modern analysts. In contrast to Vihte 
and Fermat, Descartes claimed not to concern himself with the 
method of the ancients: 
My intention has not been to detain myself with 
explaining anything that others have already 
found out, nor has my intention been to repair 
the lost works of Apollonius, like Vi&e, Snell, 
Marinus Ghetaldi, etc., did, but to pass beyond 
the ancients in every respect. I have suffi- 
ciently demonstrated this by beginning with a 
problem, which, according to Pappus, the ancients 
were unable to solve IOeuvres I, 4911. 
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Descartes' method, so he claimed, was completely original. In 
fact he did not even learn of Vi&e's work in algebra until 
after he had composed the Geometry [Oeuvres, I, 479-480; II, 821. 
While the technical aspects of Descartes' analytical methods 
might have arisen from a consideration of classical problems, 
the ontological foundation of his mathematical and methodological 
thought traced its roots to the Ramist sources mentioned in 
Bee&man's "Journal." The methodological works of Ramus grew 
out of a pedagogical movement in the Renaissance aimed at re- 
forming Aristotelian logic within the arts curriculum. Like the 
Renaissance analysts discussed above, the pedagogues were in- 
terested in supplementing traditional syliogistics with a method 
of invention. To solve the problems of the logic curriculum, 
the pedagogues turned to the field of rhetoric. They attempted 
to fashion a dialectical method of discovery by fusing elements 
of the rhetorical works of Cicero and Aristotle, particularly 
the latter's "Topics." For their purposes the most important 
aspect of Cicero's rhetoric was the theory of memory. Cicero 
had advocated a method which consisted of memorizing a series 
of places in a building and attaching to these memorized places 
images to aid in recalling the points of a speech. As Frances 
Yates describes the process: "The orator when delivering his 
speech, passed in imagination along the order of the memorized 
places, plucking from them the images which were to remind him 
of his notions" [Yates 1964, 1911. The Ciceronian art of memory 
was useful only after a speech had been constructed. In order 
to construct his speech the orator made use of the Aristotelian 
topics. The topics were "loci" or "places" where arguments on 
any given subject were stored. The topics were the headings 
or key notions to which one could turn to find what was in one's 
store of knowledge for discourse on any subject [Yates 1964, 1041. 
As mere devices for the storage and retrieval of argu- 
ments previously constructed there was no epistemological basis 
within Aristotelian theory for using the topics and loci as new 
sources for demonstrative knowledge. Therefore, in order to 
justify their method of invention, the pedagogues had to fashion 
their own epistemology. The fact that it came to be characterized 
as dialectical indicates that the new method was inspired by 
Platonic sources, but the epistemic justification for fashioning 
a general method of invention from the art of memory and the 
topics was provided by the Renaissance Neoplatonic movement. 
Whereas the ancients had only used the relationships between 
places in buildings as a mnemonic guide, Hermeticists and Neo- 
platonists regarded the cosmic order itself as a "place sytem." 
By imprinting the celestial talismanic images on the memory, 
Hermeticists hoped to reflect the universe in the mind, thereby 
enabling one to acquire universal knowledge [Yates 1964, 1921. 
Divorced of their magical connotations, the topics and loci of 
the former rhetorical tradition were thus transformed into mental 
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signatures reflecting the nature of things. These "mental places" 
were capable of rendering up their contents by the agency of a 
natural, innate dialectic of the soul. When properly trained, 
this natural dialectic, the so-called "natural light of the mind," 
could serve as the basis of a method of invention. These two 
features, the construction of knowledge from a set of mental 
loci and the natural light of the mind as the mental faculty which 
grasps directly the relationships between loci contents, provided 
the epistemological foundations for the methodological tradition 
up to and including the works of Descartes. 
The transformation of the rhetorical arts into a method of 
discovery was mainly the work of two men, Rudolph Agricola (1444- 
1485) and Petrus Ramus (1515-1572). Agricola was originally 
from the Rhine Valley, but his most important work, the Dialecti- 
cal Invention, was deeply influenced by the Italian humanist 
and Neoplatonic movements as a result of his ten-year sojourn in 
Italy [Ong 1958, 95-961. In his Training in Dialectic (1543), 
Ramus claimed to be carrying to completion the methodological 
revolution begun by Agricola. 
Ramus' dialectical method consisted of three parts--inven- 
tion, judgment and exercise--only the first two parts of which 
concern us here. Through the process of invention, the middle 
terms of syllogisms were dislodged from the topics (conceived 
by Ramus as mental loci) by the natural dialectic of the soul, 
which Ramus characterized as the "natural light of reason" [Ong 
1958, 1911. In Ramus' method, one began with a question: "is 
A, C?"where A and C were terms such as "man" and "animal." 
Reason would then make an inventory of the loci, considering the 
terms A and C in the light of each topic--in fact Ramus des- 
cribed the process as a visual juxtaposition of terms and loci 
in mental space. The natural light of the mind would then 
seize upon the middle term B, if indeed the two terms A and C 
were linked, and the syllogism "all A is B, B is C, and therefore 
A is C" could be constructed. 
The second part of the method involved judgments linking 
the syllogisms discovered by invention into chains of arguments. 
Ramus defined judgement as: 
The doctrine of collocating what invention has 
found and of judging by this collocation concern- 
ing the matter under consideration--which is 
nothing other than memory training [Quoted by Ong 
1958, 351, n. 571. 
According to Ramus the method of judgment by collocation pro- 
ceeded through a comparison of "unit corpuscles" of thought, 
the comparison being likened to a juxtaposition of pieces of 
cloth. Although the tendency to regard the loci as an original 
set of atomic ideas was not altogether absent in Agricola's 
works, most methodologists prior to Ramus still conceived 
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the loci as the topics of the older rhetorical tradition. For 
Ramus, however, the loci were not the mental repositories of 
ideas; rather the loci were an original set of "corpuscles" 
which could be combined into "clusters" [Ong 1958, 2031. The 
thrust of this methodological program was to construct higher- 
ordered clusters out of the original set of unit corpuscles, 
until one had elucidated the structure of things all the way 
from the most universal constituents down to the individual 
details. The precise method for constructing these clusters 
out of the original unit corpuscles was never stated by Ramus. 
Descartes was to fill this gap in the Renaissance methodological 
tradition. The application of the Ramist method of invention to 
a particular subject matter resulted in the analysis of the 
subject into its constituent elements or key notions. The 
application of the method of judgment reversed the analysis, 
producing a structural synthesis of the central ideas. Ramus 
applied this method of analysis and synthesis to every con- 
ceivable subject matter. He provided numerous examples of how 
to resolve a piece of literature, a poem, or a speech into its 
constituent parts, and then resynthesize them into an essential 
summary of the text. 
Although Ramus did not consider his method as mathematical, 
further development of the method in a mathematical direction 
was not without support from Ramus himself, for he believed that 
a training in mathematics prepared the mind for the rigors of his 
own method. "when I came to Euclid," he wrote, 
the study of the previous arts seemed to me not 
study but mere sport. He who will devote himself 
to the mathematical elements, to study and to learn 
them, this is truly learning and pupil (I-la8nals KCX~ 
Uaeqalu). Nothing requires a mind moxe alert, more 
attentive and directed to the material, a judgment 
more acute, and memory more prompt and constant... . 
Truly I can affirm that study is nothing at all if 
not mathematical and a pupil is nothing at all if 
not a mathematician [Ramus 1569, III, 721. 
Indeed, Ramus encouraged the use of algebraic techniques in re- 
viving the analytical method of the ancients by suggesting that 
cossist algebra represented a vulgar form of the analytical method 
employed by the Greek mathematicians [Mahoney 1971a, 551. More- 
over, echoing a claim made by Vi&e, Ramus stated in his Algebra 
that in the almucabala of the Hermetic philosophers one could 
see traces of the analytical method of the ancients [Mahoney 1973, 
11 n.]. Apart from such cryptic remarks, and even more important 
than his own contributions to mathematics, was the underlying 
tendency of his methodological thought. Most significant in 
this context was the emphasis on treating the concepts encountered 
in discourse as structures formed from clusters of thought cor- 
puscles. 
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It was in connection with mathematics that Ramus' follower, 
Rudolph Snell, foresaw the most fruitful applications of the 
Ramist method. Snel published numerous commentaries to the 
works of Ramus, including the Sneliorameum philosopiae syntagma 
(1596), in which he extolled the virtues of the Ramist method. 
But most important for our consideration was Snel's role as a 
transmitter of the Ramist tradition in the Netherlands and, in 
particular, his insistence that the true methodology was a mathe- 
matical one. It is under the influence of Snel that we see the 
merger of the methodological tradition of the pedagogues and that 
of the mathematicians interested in reconstructing the methods 
of the ancients. This influence can be traced in his son Wille- 
brord Snell, who participated in Vi&e's program of reconstruct- 
ing the analytical treatises described by Pappus. It can also 
be traced in the methodological and mathematical works of Des- 
cartes. 
There is no direct evidence to indicate that Descartes 
actually read the works of Ramus. There is indirect evidence, 
however, that Descartes' contact with Ram&t method was fostered 
through his acquaintance with Isaac Beeckman. Bee&man had been 
a student of Rudolph Snel at Leyden in 1609. As mentioned 
earlier, Bee&man's "Journal" recorded that Snel had recommended 
works by Ramus in geometry and arithmetic as proper grounding in 
mathematics. It is perhaps not an unlikely assumption that 
Bee&man passed the recommendation on to Descartes, who in 1619 
was eager to learn mathematics. 
Additional evidence that Bee&man and Descartes included 
Ramus in their discussions on method is provided by their corre- 
spondence. In March and April of 1619 the two corresponded on 
the Ars brevis of Raymon Lull. From his "Journal" we learn that 
Bee&man considered Ramus' dialectical method to be an extension 
of the art of Raymon Lull [Oeuvres, X, 63-651, so that it may 
not be too farfetched to infer that the Ramist method could have 
been brought up at some point in their discussions. All of this, 
of course, remains conjectural; but the textual evidence of his 
Rules for the Direction of the Mind leaves little doubt that, 
while Descartes claimed elsewhere to have surpassed the Lullian 
Art by replacing its dubious combinatory processes with the 
algebraic techniques of the cossists [Oeuvres, X, 156-1571, the 
fruits of his early methodological speculations had deep roots 
in the Lullian-Ramist tradition. Descartes' Rules for the Direc- 
tion of the Mind was in the Renaissance tradition of the search 
for a universal method of discovery, and it is not unwarranted 
to link Descartes' epistemology and methodology to the Ramist 
movement of educational reform which used the methods of mathe- 
matics as a model for attaining certainty. 
Like Ramus, Descartes did not use "mathematics" in its 
normal sense. He noted that the term "mathematics" derives 
etymoloqically from the Greek root *'~c6nazs," which is best 
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translated as "learning." This, he said, implies that all other 
disciplines are called mathematical, with no less priority than 
mathematics, in that they are all forms of learning [Descartes 
1629, 3781. But there was a reason more fundamental than this 
for his adoption of mathematics as the basis for a methodology. 
Descartes explained his choice as follows: 
But as I considered the matter more attentively, 
it finally became clear that only those subjects 
in which order and measure are considered are re- 
garded as mathematical, and it makes no difference 
whether such measure is sought in numbers, or 
figures, or stars, or sounds, or any other subject 
whatever. It then follows that there must be a 
certain general science which explains everything 
which can be asked about order and measure, and 
which is concerned with no particular subject 
matter, and that this very thing is called mathesis 
universalis [Descartes 1629, 3781. 
The passage echoes a familiar theme in late Renaissance treatises 
on method: the view that knowledge consists in grasping the 
structural relationship among things, and that the science of 
structural relationships is the foundation of a mathesis uni- 
versalis, a method for achieving certainty in any field. The 
application of the general science, described in the above 
passage, to the field of mathematics proper would seem to call 
for the development of an analytic mathematics based on the 
pure science of abstract structure, a science such as Leibniz 
was later to call the logic of characteristics. What Descartes 
had in mind, however, was something quite different. 
Descartes' analytic method was the tool with which he pro- 
posed to dispel his skeptical doubt and provide a secure founda- 
tion for knowledge. Descartes noted in the Rules, as well as in 
the Meditations, that from the earliest period of his youth he 
had acquired false opinions from others, mostly teachers. This 
did not mean that the whole fabric of his knowledge was erroneous. 
Indeed, he had acquired some true opinions, but the problem was 
to distinguish the true from the false opinions and to root out 
the latter. However, it was impossible to do that so long as 
both true and false statements were interrelated within the 
same epistemological framework. He had, therefore, to cast 
everything into doubt and build a new framework consisting only 
of true statements: he would not accept any opinion without first 
examining it. The criteria for the acceptance of any Statement 
were to be its "clarity and distinctness"; whatever was clear 
and distinct was immediately or intuitively obvious, that is, 
"true." 
The initial problem was where to begin once everything had 
been cast into doubt. How did one discover the first clear 
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and distinct idea upon which to begin building the whole edifice 
of knowledge? Descartes assigned the task of discovering clear 
and distinct ideas to the act of intuition produced by the 
"natural light of reason" [Descartes 1629, 3681. For Descartes, 
one began with natural reason and intuited an original set of 
clear and distinct ideas which were implanted in the mind. "The 
human mind," he said, "has a certain touch of divinity in which 
the seeds of useful thought already lie, so that often, no matter 
how much they are neglected and suffocated by interfering studies, 
they spontaneously produce fruit" [Descartes 1629, 3731. These 
ideas were more or less the furniture of the mind, and like the 
Ramist "thought corpuscles," they served as a basis for construct- 
ing the whole fabric of knowledge. 
The method of discovery, by means of which knowledge was 
constructed from the original set of ideas, was also dependent 
upon the power of intuition: 
There are a few pure and simple essences which can 
be recognized at first independently of all others 
by means of the intuitive light in ourselves. These 
should be carefully noted, for all other things can 
only be perceived as being deduced from them by means 
of comparison... [Descartes 1629, 3831. 
For example, if we want to find the relationship 
between A and C, we compare each of these terms 
to the given (original) clear and distinct idea 
B. If B is an idea common to them both, it is 
transferred from one subject to the other by simple 
comparison. In this way we can discover the argu- 
ment "All A is B , all B is C, therefore all A is 
c't [Descartes 1629, 439-4401. 
As this passage indicates, once a foundation of clear and dis- 
tinct ideas had been established, the method proceeded by set- 
ting up comparisons between new, unknown terms and the basic 
relationships between the clear and distinct terms. The dis- 
covery of the relationships linking new terms with clear and 
distinct ideas was completely a function of natural reason. 
The way in which Descartes dealt with relations between 
clear and distinct ideas demonstrates that, while he considered 
the structural relations between things as the key to knowing, 
his mathesis universalis was not a purely abstract science of 
structure, such as we find in the works of the 19th-century 
algebraists. Descartes believed that the mind could be misled 
if it paid attention only to symbols and relations between 
symbols. Abstract symbolisms were completely lacking in content. 
In all cases we should carefully observe that we use 
the assistance of our imagination, because if our 
mind pays close attention to words it can make in- 
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cautious judgments. The imagination ought to 
depict a true idea of the object. . . [Descartes 
1629, 4451. 
All ideas should be represented by figures 
[Descartes 1629, 4501. 
There simply was no basis for fastening a statement to the solid 
foundation of innate ideas unless the content of those ideas 
could be pictured in the imagination. Just as Ramus had compared 
the process of discovery through judgment to that of matching 
bits of cloth, so for Descartes the process of discovery was one 
of matching mental images. 
Once the relationship between innate ideas had been es- 
tablished through the process of comparison, it could be reduced 
to a proportion. As Descartes viewed it, all relations consist 
in proportions between the items compared. After establishing 
the "proportions" between innate ideas, he argued that "the 
investigation consists only in reducing these proportions to 
such a form that we can clearly perceive an equality between 
the entity sought for and something else which is known" 
[Descartes 1629, 4401. Next Descartes observed that nothing 
can be reduced to the form of an equality unless it can exist 
as a "more" or "less," and all this, he said, is included in 
the term "magnitude." 
In consequence, we recognize that . . . when we con- 
sider the terms of the difficulty in any subject 
whatsoever, we are, in the final analysis, only 
concerned with magnitude in general. And since 
we must make use of the imagination in order to 
aid the process of discovery, it is necessary that 
we translate what we understand about magnitudes 
in general into that particular magnitude that we 
can most easily and distinctly picture in our im- 
agination [Descartes 1629, 440.1 
By this subtle maneuver Descartes had reduced the entire process 
of discovery to a general science of magnitude. Since the 
solution of every conceptual problem consists in establishing 
relations for reducing the problem to things already known, the 
general science of measure must underlie all our conceptual acts. 
Furthermore, since in Descartes' view an act of the imagination 
must accompany all our conceptual acts in order to guarantee 
their "truth" or legitimate empirical employment, abstract rela- 
tions of measure are only intelligible when they are represented 
by the concrete image of relations between extended magnitudes. 
Therefore, the true method for dispelling skepticism and expand- 
ing the horizons of knowledge consists in framing all our con- 
cepts only in accordance with the principles for relating and 
comparing magnitudes. In one fell swoop, the structure of cog- 
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nitive relations and the structure of the external world were 
reduced to the structure of Euclidean geometry. 
Perhaps nothing better illustrates the extent to which this 
represents a geometrization of thought than Descartes' own sum- 
mary of his method: 
In order to examine the relationships or propor- 
tions between things, I judged that it would be 
better to examine these proportions in general, 
and use particular objects as illustrations of 
the principles of these relationships. I real- 
ized that in order to understand the principles 
of relationships I would have to consider them 
as relationships between lines, because I could 
find nothing more easily pictured to my imagina- 
tion.... What pleased me about this was that it 
enabled me to reason in all things, if not per- 
fectly, at least as well as was in my power 
[Descartes 1629, 441-4421. 
Consider the implications of Descartes' description of his mathe- 
sis. As a tool for the acquisition of knowledge, it depends 
upon being able to unlock the relationships which determine the 
way things are. But these relationships are only intelligible 
when accompanied by a concrete representation produced by the 
imagination, which means they must be represented as proportional 
relationships between lines. Since the object of geometry is 
to explicate the ways in which lines can be related to one an- 
other, it follows that the only relations which have cognitive 
content in the Cartesian system are those which can be arrived 
at by applying the principles of geometry. Thus, geometry 
provides the basis for constructing our knowledge of the ex- 
ternal world. Indeed, it is the basis for thought itself. 
We have not yet discussed the role of algebra in Descartes' 
method of invention, but it had an important role to play. The 
derivation of subsidiary scientific principles from the original 
set of clear and distinct ideas often required a lengthy chain 
of deductions. Here was an opportunity for error to creep in, 
even if one dealt only with clear and distinct ideas. The 
source of the error, Descartes noted, was in the infirmity of 
the memory: 
If, for example, by means of various procedures 
I should first recognize what the relationship 
between A and B is, then between B and C, then 
between C and D, finally between D and E, I do 
not on that account see the relation between A 
and E, nor can I deduce it precisely from the 
relationships I already know, unless I remember 
all of them [Descartes 1629, 387-3881. 
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Certainty depended upon being able to visualize the relation 
between A and E directly in mental space. Since one could 
not take in all the terms of a complex argument in a single 
glance of intuition, it was possible to make inappropriate link- 
ages between clear and distinct ideas. To avoid this source of 
error, Descartes asserted-the need for techniques of enumerating 
the terms in an argument and then storing them in a way which 
preserved their order -of succession [Descartes 1629, 3891. 
3. CONCLUSION: THE ROOTS OF DESCARTES' CONSTRUCTIVIST MATHEMATICS 
Descartes' interest in mechanical linkages for describing 
curves by a single continuous motion, as well as the function 
he assigned to algebraic equations, becomes apparent in the 
light of this methodological concern with mnemonic devices. Each 
new line constructed by the devices described in the Geometry 
followed in a mechanically determined sequence, a sequence in 
which the order of succession was always preserved. Each locus 
produced by the linkage could be used to designate a class of 
clear and distinct ideas related in an idea-complex by the equa- 
tion of the curve; the sequence of loci produced by the succes- 
sion of mechanically linked lines represented a systematic hier- 
archy of idea-complexes generated out of the original set of 
clear and distinct ideas. Moreover, within each class clear 
rules of construction existed for reducing related idea-complexes 
to the common type of the class. We see, therefore, that Des- 
cartes' methodological program aimed at the production of a 
systematic rational taxonomy of nature. In such a methodological 
program, the transcendental curves could be of no service: one 
could have indubitable knowledge only of things that had been 
derived through a direct comparison between clear and distinct 
ideas, and the transcendental curves required two incommensurate 
motions for their description. The fabric of knowledge was to 
be constructed out of proportions between clear and distinct 
ideas; but no finite proportions could be established between 
the motions descriptive of the transcendental curves. Accord- 
ingly, as devices for storing information and thus enabling the 
mind to traverse the series of connections between the original 
"seeds of knowledge" and lower-level cognitions, those curves 
were useless. Incapable of being reduced to measure, they had 
no place in a rational taxonomy and could only be of service in 
a philosophy of nature that had given up certainty in favor of 
conjecture and probability. 
Finally, in order to store the relationships between clear 
and distinct ideas in a manner which would enable one to resolve 
an idea-complex into its constituents, Descartes "enumerated" 
each line by symbol, and the relationships between the different 
lines by an equation. This served two purposes. First, if one 
wanted to examine the relationship between two constituent terms 
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in an idea-complex, one could retrace the steps of the former 
geometric construction immediately without having to depend on 
the memory to provide a reconstruction. Second, by allowing 
equations to designate idea-complexes, one could represent the 
relations between components in an idea-complex, each component 
equation representing an idea-complex itself. This too would 
facilitate the memory in making an inventory of the specific 
relationships between clear and distinct ideas. 
At the level of idea-complexes one is tempted to discard 
the restrictive scaffolding supplied by the mechanical linkage 
and allow the analysis of equations to suggest new idea-complexes 
and relations among ideas. This, however, grates sharply against 
the spirit of Descartes' methodological program. For Descartes' 
equations served only as the enumerative devices required by 
Rule VII for aiding the memory. In order to guarantee that al- 
gebraic manipulations of idea-complexes were truth preserving, 
the intuitive function of natural reason required the assistance 
of the pictorial power of the imagination. 
Descartes' overarching concern with the construction of 
methodology powerful enough to disarm his Pyronian skepticism 
provides a background against which to view the conception of 
mathematics presented in the Geometry. In discussing Descartes' 
Rules for the Direction of the Mind, I have pointed out that 
with regard to his mathesis universalis, Descartes maintained 
that one should not perform purely logical operations on al- 
gebraic equations which had been abstracted from all content. 
In order to avoid mistakes which might arise from manipulating 
empty symbols, Descartes supplemented the logical calculus of 
his mathesis with a pictogram formed in the imagination. Al- 
though in any given case the pictogram was itself a symbolic 
representation of an argument, it served to make the operations 
of the mathesis in a certain sense concrete, so that they could 
be directly inspected by intuition. I would urge that Descartes' 
reluctance to admit equations into geometry for which a corre- 
sponding geometrical construction could not be given was an 
attempt at remaining consistent with the metaphysical foundations 
of his mathesis universalis. Algebraic equations did not supply 
the clear and distinct ideas characteristic of geometry; rather 
they were obtained through the construction of geometric figures. 
NOTES 
1. This was the opinion in the 17th century at least. The 
mistaken view originated with Pappus in Book VII of his Mathe- 
matical Collection, where he reports: "Apollonius declared in 
his third book that the loci of three and four lines had not 
been treated completely by Euclid, but even he himself was un- 
able to exhaust it, and no one else was able to do it, nor was 
anyone else even able to add anything to what had already been 
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done by Euclid, with the aid of only the techniques known in 
Euclid's era" [Pappus, VII, 5071. 
2. As Molland has demonstrated, Descartes' rendering of 
Greek ideas about classification is incorrect, and he gives a 
balanced view of what this classification really was and how 
little it was fixed. See [Molland 19761. 
3. This statement of the problem is taken from a letter 
written by Descartes in 1645 [Oeuvres, IV, 229-2301. The treat- 
ment of the problem that follows is taken from Descartes' letter 
to De Beaune from 20 February 1639 [Oeuvres, II, 514-5171. For 
excellent formal treatments see [Scriba 1960, 409-416; Vuillemin 
1960, 11-25; Adam' and Tannery, Descartes' Oeuvres, II, 520-5231. 
The discussion here is indebted to these sources. 
4. According to Scriba [1960, 413-4241, from the double 
inequality for AY it is possible to construct the ordinates for 
each point, for example, Ay and A6. The magnitudes of the Y- 
segments y6 corresponding to successive unit distances along the 
x-axis (assuming y is further from the axis and accordingly that 
n.1 < n2 < m) are thus given by - 
n2 - nl n2 - n1 b 
n2 
b < seg < 
nl 
I 
m 
n2 nl 
i I 
m 
n2 n1 - --- 
"2 m m 
b <seg< - --7 b. 
i 1 "1 m 
The result reported by Descartes follows immediately by allowing 
m = 8 and taking successive values of n2 and nl. It is interest- 
ing to note that Descartes'series approximation for the segment 
y6 is equivalent to log n2/n1. Moreover, the form of his solu- 
tion is quite similar to the approach taken by Napier [Whiteside 
1960, 218-2191. 
5. For an opposing view, see [Mahoney 1971bl. Mahoney 
argues that Descartes' essential contribution to the development 
of algebraic thought was to have abstracted mathematical opera- 
tions from visual, physical space (p. 17). According to Mahoney, 
Descartes' mathematics has no ontological foundation; it is 
rather a science of pure structure (p. 29). It seems to me that 
this interpretation is not fully "Cartesian" in spirit, for 
while Descartes had most definitely separated his mathematics 
from physical space, it was not on that account stripped of all 
ontological foundations. As we shall see, Descartes' mathe- 
matical thought was based on a visualist ontology which had its 
roots in his philosophical method and his theory of mental 
operations. 
6. This connection has been suggested in several studies 
of Renaissance works on method. Walter Ong [1958] suggests 
that Descartes' Rules for the Direction of the Mind should be 
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viewed in the Ramist methodological tradition. In both Giordano 
Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition and the Art of Memory, Frances 
Yates claims that Descartes' Rules are also to be seen in the 
light of the Renaissance mnemonic traditions closely connected 
with the Hermetic Movement. Finally, Michael Mahoney [1971a, 
1971b] claims that Descartes' contributions to the 17th-century 
algebraic movement emerged from a cross-fertilization of the 
Ramist methodological tradition and classical geometrical analy- 
sis. In what follows, I attempt to trace the concrete manner 
in which these two traditions influenced Descartes' methodolog- 
ical thought and, moreover, that the interaction of his meth- 
odological thought with his mathematics helps to explain the 
curious fact, noted first by Boyer, that while all the pre- 
conditions are present in the Geometry, Descartes did not grasp 
the fundamental notion of analytic geometry. 
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